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Silja Graupe 
The Power of Ideas. 
The Teaching of Economics and its Image of Man1 
“I don't care who writes a nation's laws 
− − or crafts its advanced treaties  
if I can write its economics textbooks.”
(Paul Samuelson)
Economics as a science not only investigates what is (as a positive science) 
and what should be (as a normative science), but influences, through its 
fundamental ideas, what facts and norms are recognized as such in society. 
This holds especially true for economic education. My article explains this 
thesis and elaborates, in particular, how this form of education stipulates a 
particular vision of human beings worldwide. First, I show how economics 
actively seeks to influence the inscription of the commonplace image of the 
human through economics  education.  Second,  I  discuss  economics  as  a 
textbook science in Thomas Kuhn’s sense: as a science incapable of giving 
the students any plural or critical understanding of their self and the world. 
In the third step, I identify the essential features of the human image lying 
at the base of the economic curriculum; an image (so I argue), which splits 
society into mere cogs in the machine of the economy on the one side and 
omnipotent social engineers on the other side.  
Keywords
Critique  of  Economics,  economic  education,  textbook  science,  historical 
amnesia, image of man, mechanistic worldview 
1 Introduction
Why  study  economics?  Paul  Samuelson,  the  most  famous  economics 
textbook writer of all time, answered this question with the following words 
of John Maynard Keynes (1955, 12): 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers,  both when they  
are  right and  when  they  are  wrong,  are  more  powerful  than  is  
commonly  understood.  Indeed  the  world  is  ruled  by  little  else.  
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any  
intellectual  influence,  are  usually  the  slaves  of  some  defunct  
economist.  Madmen  in  authority,  who  hear  voices  in  the  air,  are  
distilling their  frenzy from some academic scribbler  of a  few years  
back. I am sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated  
1 Translated from the German by Roger Gathman. 
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compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.”
This  allows  us  to  discover  an  important  thesis  about  the  function  of 
economics  as  a  science:  it  not  only  investigates  what  is  (as  a  positive 
science)  and  what  should  be  (as  a  normative  science),  but  influences, 
through its fundamental  ideas,  what  facts and norms are recognized as 
such in society. It forms something like the base of thought, from which we 
think about the economy and society, without ever reflecting on it in turn. It 
determines,  tacitly,  the  assumptions  of  our  scientific  reason,  without, 
conversely, being interrogated by that reason. Thus, economics immobilizes 
what  can  appear  to  us  as  the  most  interesting  problems  or  relevant 
questions in science. It forms what Ludwik Fleck (1980, 130) would call a 
thought  style:  “It  is  readiness  for  both  selective  feeling  and  for 
correspondingly  directed  action.  ...  It  constrains  the  individual  and 
determines what cannot be thought in any other way.”
In  the  following  I  want  to  explain  this  thesis  and  thus  elaborate,  in 
particular,  how economics is  inscribed with a particular vision of human 
beings. Doing this, I will start with the following idea: We cannot normally 
foreground our image of man in order to observe it. Rather, it is inscribed 
in how we see ourselves and others and the kind of explanations we seek 
for our humanity. Fundamentally, our images of man are not images at all, 
but  ‘lenses’ or  ‘filters’ through which we selectively observe our action in 
the  world:  “Our  image  of  the  human  is  already,  in  our  pre-scientific 
reflection, an indissoluble component of our everyday activity” (Meinberg 
1988, 10). 
My essay is divided into three steps. In the first, I  show how economics 
actively seeks to influence the inscription of the commonplace image of the 
human  through  economics  education.  Second,  I  attempt  to  present  an 
insight into the basic features of this form of education. Here, economics 
will  become visible as a textbook science in Thomas Kuhn’s sense: as a 
science incapable of giving the students any plural or critical understanding 
of self and the world. In the third step, I will identify the essential features 
of the twofold human image that, I would argue, lies at the base of the 
economic curriculum. On the basis of this image, students get trained to 
understand themselves on the one hand as “pleasure machines,” “robots,” 
or  “laboratory  guinea  pigs.”  On  the  other  hand,  they  learn  to  identify 
themselves  as  social  engineers  who  observe  other people  as  pleasure 
machines,  robots,  or  guinea  pigs  and to  strive  to  manipulate  the  latter 
according to their own ideas and interests. 
2 The Influence of Economic Education 
Globally,  economics  is  booming  as  a  discipline.  In  US  colleges  and 
universities alone, 1.5 million students annually enroll in the introductory 
economics course (Nasar 1995). “This introductory course is both the first 
and the last  brush that  most  educated Americans have  with supply and 
demand, marginal cost, comparative advantage and other first principles of 
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the dismal science” (ibid). One could make a similar observation about the 
approximately  360,000  students  of  economics  departments  in  German 
universities  who  make  up  nearly  seventeen  percent  of  all  students  in 
Germany  (Statistisches  Bundesamt  2010).  They,  too,  in  their  beginning 
micro-  and  macroeconomics  classes  are  obliged  to  confront  economics 
thought. Even if in the past, most ambitious economists focused “on the 
kind of esoteric research that might win them a Nobel Prize,” they are now 
jumping at this chance “to mold the minds of the next generation of political 
leaders, executives, image makers and other members of the … elite” (Nasar 
1995). Here, we are not speaking simply about the power to shape individual 
lectures or seminars; rather, the great names in the guild strive to write 
textbooks  powerful  enough  to  dictate  the  canons  of  their  discipline  to 
almost all universities around the world.
To begin with, it is a question of dominance within a giant market. In the 
United  States  alone,  the  market  for  introductory  economics  textbooks 
measures about fifty million dollars per year. Of the thirty to forty books that 
compete  for  this  revenue,  a  handful  secures  the  lion’s  share.  Of  these 
blockbusters, as the New York Times, not without admiration, names them, 
each sells annually about 50,000 books at a price of about fifty five dollars 
each (Nasar 1995). The first fifteen editions of Paul Samuelson’s Economics 
(from  1948-1995)  sold  approximately  about  four  million  copies,  not 
counting the more than forty translations (Skousen 1997). The careers of 
other textbook authors are similarly steep.  Take for example Gregory N. 
Mankiw,  who  was  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  under 
President George W. Bush. He was not only paid by Harcourt  Publisher a 
record  advance  of  1.4  million  dollars  for  his  textbook,  Principles  of 
Economics, but also received a bonus of twenty two percent for each copy 
sold – with sales reaching well beyond the million. Here, too, we are not 
counting the revenue garnered from over ten translations (Nasar 1995). 
Yet the superstars of the intro economics textbooks business do not simply 
seek money and wealth. By their own account, they are much more invested 
in the struggle for the best minds in our society. “The top three or four 
textbooks,  even the top 10,  are  profitable,  wildly profitable”  admits,  for 
example,  Mankiw.  And  he  adds:  “Besides,  economists  are  proselytizers” 
(quoted in Nasar 1995). Paul Samuelson formulates the point as follows: “My 
interest  was  not  so  much  in  dollars  as  in  influencing  minds”  (quoted 
Gottesman, Ramrattan, Szenberg 2005, 98, my emphasis). Here, as in the 
fact that authors like Samuelson are, especially in the United States, often 
treated as “high priests” and their books as “bibles” or “gospels,”2 we find 
that  economists do not  only desire to sell  heaps of their  standard intro 
economics textbooks; they also want them to be  read a million fold. They 
wish  their  content  to  be  actually  learned  and  understood,  pushed,  if 
necessary,  by the constant pressure of grading and exams.3 It  all  comes 
2 Compare for instance  the obituary  notices in the Wall  Street  Journal  (December 13, 2009)  published on the occasion  of Paul 
Samuelson’s death, where Robert Hall, Professor at Stanford, for instance, writes: “His book, Foundations of Economic Analysis, was a 
bible  to my generation of economists, trained entirely  in  the then-new Samuelson mode.” Samuelson writes about himself:  I  was 
besieged by groupies reminiscent of Talmudic students crowding around famous rabbis. The policeman at the door of the White House 
whispers, ‘I am using your book at Georgetown night school.’ The chap who sells me a newspaper at Harvard Square confides that at 
Northeastern he studied my book. . . . Wherever I go in Europe, Asia, or Latin America, strangers greet me as an old friend or old 
tormenter. I have never been to India, Russia, or China, but in my MIT office, I am asked to autograph copies of translations” (quoted in  
Gottesman, Ramrattan, Szenberg 2005, 98).
3 Samuelson also invokes another form of pressure. He tells his students to consider the study of economics a factor absolutely  
decisive to success or failure in the daily struggle for existence: “As we have come to realize, there is one overriding reason for learning  
the basic lessons of economics: All your life – from the cradle to grave and beyond –  you will run up against the brutal truths of  
economics. (…) Of course, studying economics cannot make you a genius. But without economics, the dice of life are loaded against  
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down to consciously influencing the ideas, attitudes, and imaginations of 
each new generation: 
“It  is  hard  to  gauge  the  influence  of  Samuelson's  textbook,  or  in  
general  the  impact  of  introductory  courses  in  economics,  on  U.S.  
policymakers or corporate executives. Samuelson has been willing to  
claim, with tongue only slightly in cheek, a considerable impact. He  
has made a well-known comment: ‘I don't care who writes a nation's  
laws – or crafts its advanced treaties – if I  can write its economics  
textbooks.’ 
He has also expressed hope that his textbook would be a reference  
guide for former students. ‘When the election of 1984 rolls around,’  
he wrote in 1967, ‘all the hours that the artists and editors and I have 
spent in making the pages as informative and authentic as possible  
will seem to me well spent if somewhere a voter turns to the old book 
from which he learned economics for a rereasoning of the economic  
principle involved” (Skousen 1997, 149-50). 
Mankiw writes in his preface to the instructor (2001, vii): “Economists have a 
unique way of viewing the world, much of which can be taught in one or two 
semesters. My goal in this book is to transmit this way of thinking to the 
widest possible audience and to convince readers that it illuminates much of 
the  world  around  them.”  Critical  economists  like  Steve  Keen see  in  this 
nothing less than a campaign of ideological persuasion: “What I had initially 
thought  was an education in economics was in fact  little  better than an 
indoctrination” (Keen 2001, xiii).
3 Economics as a Textbook Science 
In order to be able to relate to Keen’s reproach, we first need to understand 
how the self-conception of economics as a science has substantially changed 
over the last seventy years or so. Originally, economics had defined itself by 
means of its subject matter: it sought to explain the world of commerce 
(see, for example, Becker 1990). In this way, what economists did was rather 
well-defined. They were supposed to analyze what was commonly seen as 
‘commercial’ or ‘economic’ matters.4 This limitation in relation to the object 
of research stood in contrast to a great freedom with regard to the manner 
of  research.  Each  economist  could  freely  control  his  methodological 
approach, and thus how he was to conduct his research. In consequence the 
self-understanding of the economic sciences was plural: it unified a number 
of  perspectives  on ‘economic’  phenomena.  Modern  economics,  however, 
negates this pluralistic self-understanding and inverses the freedom of the 
researcher  into  its  exact  opposite.  Gary  Becker,  a  leading  figure  of  the 
Chicago School of Economics and the Nobel Prize winner in economics for 
you” (Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, 3, my emphasis). In an earlier edition (1955, 3), Samuelson even writes: “Thus, even from the purely 
egotistic standpoint of self interest [it is important to] find answers to ... the questions of modern economic life” (my emphasis).
4 This is to say that economics was believed to simply analyze the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services or, 
more specifically, the allocation of limited resources to the satisfaction of mutually exclusive ends. Common to these definitions is that 
they refer to the objects of economic investigation, but do not prescribe the methods, with which one should investigate these objects. 
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1992,  codified  this  turn-about  as  follows:  “That  which  distinguishes 
economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the social sciences is not 
its  subject  matter  but  its  approach”  (1990,  5,  my  emphasis).  Scientific 
freedom  means, for Becker, that fundamentally all  social subjects may be 
analyzed by the economist: from “fertility, education and the uses of time, 
crime,  marriage,  social  interactions,  and  other  ‘sociological,’  ‘legal,’  and 
‘political’  problems” (ibid,  8).  Nothing less than all  human behavior gets 
reduced to an object of economic research: 
“Indeed, I have come to the position that the economic approach is a 
comprehensive  one  that  is  applicable  to all  human behavior,  be  it  
behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, repeated  
or  infrequent  decisions,  large  or  minor  decisions,  emotional  or  
mechanical  ends,  rich  or  poor  persons,  men or  women,  adults  or  
children,  brilliant  or  stupid  persons  patients  or  therapists,  
businessmen or politicians, teachers or students” (ibid).
Under  the flag  of  this  economic  imperialism,5 modern economics  claims 
absolute freedom in the choice of its subject matter. Yet this is bought at the 
price of a substantial limitation of the choice over one’s research methods. 
The economist must (and should!) probe absolutely everything in the world. 
But  he has to approach it  from a single angle of vision:  that  of modern 
microeconomics or neoclassical theory. Only the “combined assumptions of 
maximizing  behavior,  market  equilibrium,  and  stable  preferences,  used 
relentlessly and unflinchingly,  form the heart  of  the economic approach” 
(ibid, 5). While the economist may have become free to analyze everything in 
the world, he has no choice regarding the rules of thought by which he 
undertakes this analysis. In order to preserve the unity of economics as a 
science,  he  must  renounce  the  multiplicity  of  conceptual  possibilities  in 
order to align himself with a single  technique of thinking. In this way, a 
monoculture of thought is established, that extends far over the borders of 
what we usually understand to be ‘economic’ or ‘commercial.’
Often I hear colleagues reply that one can easily exaggerate the power of 
this monoculture, if one ignores, on the one hand, the many directions that 
are alternative to the economic mainstream, and on the other hand, refuses 
to recognize the extent to which the mainstream itself continually works so 
as to perfect and refine its approach. These objections might be justified, at 
most,  with  respect  to  research.  But  in  regard  to  the  curriculum,  they 
certainly mistake the actual heart of things. Because in the lecture halls of 
the world, the neoclassical refinements do not count; nor does their critique. 
Both are not taught, or only taught in later semesters. It is much more likely 
that the following prevails: 
“Normal science can keep the student and practitioner on the straight 
and narrow if  there develops an interpretive tradition that makes it  
unnecessary to consult  the canonical  texts with all  their  ambiguity,  
passion,  and  contingency.  The  development  of  textbooks  is  a  
5 We are not using, here, some insult forged by critics, but the explicit self-understanding, in particular, of a science that has been 
colored by the Chicago School of Economics. “I am an economic imperialist. I believe good techniques have a wide application” says, for 
example, Gary Becker about himself (1993).
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hallmark  of  that  interpretive  tradition.  Teachers  of  economics  
sometimes complain that, pedagogical style apart, current economics  
textbooks  are  almost  all  alike.  (…)  The  existence  of  canonical  
textbooks  is  a  considerable  part  of  what  distinguishes  economics  
from other social sciences” (Pearce, Hoover 1995, 184).
A  remark  attributed  to  Paul  Samuelson  goes:  “Economists  are  said  to 
disagree too much but in ways that are too much alike: If eight sleep in the 
same bed, you can be sure that, like Eskimos, when they turn over, they’ll all 
turn  over  together”  (quoted  in  Weinstein  2009).  This  aptly  hits  on  the 
superstars of the intro economics textbooks, especially in regard to their 
microeconomic insights. In this case, it even seems wholly appropriate to 
say – to remain with Samuelson’s image – that all have slept in the same bed 
for decades, but up to now none of them, either individually or together, has 
turned over. Let us look at this more closely. Today’s economic doctrine is 
commonly divided into the domains of micro and macro economics. To put 
it a little simply, microeconomics is ascribed the task of explaining, mainly, 
the  individual  behavior  of  economic  actors.  Here  economists  divide  the 
social world into two classes: the consumer and the producer. Then they 
observe the behavior of a single individual of each class, in order to draw 
conclusions about all consumers or producers. Thus, microeconomics gives 
us a methodological individualism,6 in which the behavior of groups can only 
be explained from the aggregation of individual actions. On this basis there 
arises the image of an ideal market. It is imagined that individual consumers 
with already given preferences always meet individual suppliers with likewise 
fixed  ideas  of  profit  on  markets  as  though  for  the  first  time.  Social 
interaction is considered an end result in this view, but is not seen through 
as  the  driving  force  behind  individual  utility  and  gain  calculi.  Modern 
macroeconomics appropriates the principles of methodological individualism 
unhesitatingly, in order to dedicate itself to the representation and shaping 
of  the  mutual  effects  of  different  markets,  for  example  those  of 
commodities, labor and capital. It is understood, in other words, to be micro 
founded. Already from this rudimentary description we can see the fact that 
microeconomics  fundamentally  shapes  the  human  image  which  then 
grounds  all  further  economic  descriptions  of  social  interactions.  And 
precisely in regard to this subject area the following holds true: even if the 
macroeconomic  content  of  all  standard  textbooks  already  shows  “a 
surprising degree of consensus” (Walstad, Watts, Bosshard 1998, 198-99), 
microeconomics represents precisely that subject area where “the victory of 
Samuelson's early pedagogy has been most complete and where the beliefs 
of economists have changed least” (Skousen 1997, 138). Whether in Greek, 
German, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrew, Serbo-Croatian or Spanish, and under 
whatsoever  title:  in  regard  to  the  basic  understanding  of  humanity  and 
human action, all the important economics textbooks of our time establish a 
single, unified lingo. 
In  order  to  trace  this  phenomenon  more  precisely,  I  suggest  grasping 
microeconomics as a textbook or normal science, as described by Thomas S. 
Kuhn (1996, 17): 
6 The concept of “methodological individualism” goes back to Joseph Schumpeter (1908).
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“In the early stages of the development of any science different men  
confronting the same range of  phenomena, but  not  usually  all  the  
same particular phenomena, describe and interpret them in different  
ways. What is surprising, and perhaps also unique in its degree to the 
field we call science, is that such initial divergences should ever largely 
disappear. For the do disappear to a very considerable extent and then 
apparently once and for all.”
Actually, current economics textbooks, almost without exception, are based 
on a single economic theory of human behavior that was already established 
in the middle of the 19th century: the neo-classical. In this way, they prevent 
the  student  in  this  science  from meeting  with  the  usual  multiplicity  of 
perspectives, visions and ideas:
“More  than  a  decade  before  I  became  an  undergraduate,  a  major  
theoretical battle had broken out over the validity of economic theory. 
Yet none of this turned up in the standard undergraduate or honours 
curriculum – unless it was raised by some dissident instructor. There  
were  also  entire  schools  of  thought  which  were  antithetical  to  
conventional economics, which again were ignored unless there was a 
dissident on staff” (Keen 2001, xiii).
The textbook science grounds a pedagogic concept that in essence rests on 
forgetting history, or more precisely, on an almost complete forgetting of 
economics ’own intellectual history and history of ideas:
“Textbooks, however, [are] pedagogic vehicles for the perpetuation of 
normal science (…) Textbooks thus begin by truncating the scientist’s 
sense  of  his  discipline’s  history  and  then  proceed  to  supply  a  
substitute for what they have eliminated. Characteristically, textbooks 
of  science  contain  just  a  bit  of  history,  either  in  an  introductory  
chapter or, more often, in scattered references to the great heroes of 
an earlier age. From such references both students and professionals  
come to feel  like participants in a long-standing historical  tradition.  
Yet the textbook-derived tradition in which scientists come to sense  
their  participation  is  one  that,  in  fact,  never  existed”  (Kuhn  1996,  
138).
Certainly, Kuhn himself was making this statement simply in regard to the 
natural sciences. Yet economics has attempted, since its origin in the 18th 
century,  to  be  a  science,  "which  resembles  the  physico-mathematical 
sciences in every respect" (Walras 1969, 71). And this ambition is mirrored in 
a forgetting of history that takes shape in the way economics textbooks veil 
the ancestry and dynamic history of their science and abbreviate it beyond 
recognition, a process very similar to what Kuhn describes in the case of the 
natural sciences. For instance, in the first edition of Samuelson’s Economics 
we find just a single page dedicated to the history of economics (1955, 12-
13). This is presented by Samuelson as an “ancestral  portrait  gallery,”  in 
which he only mentions five economists: John Maynard Keynes and Adam 
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Smith, whom he praises, Karl Marx, whom he refers to as the “black sheep” 
of the economic profession, as well as David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.7 In 
the newer  editions  of  his  textbook,  even these rudimentary descriptions 
drop out; instead of which we find a few disparate references to “important 
figures in economics” (Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, xx). If the student thus 
will already find it almost impossible to clearly locate scholarly positions and 
approaches  within  the  original  multiplicity  of  economics  opinions  and 
perspectives,  other  textbooks  drop  out  even  these  sporadic  remarks 
concerning  the  intellectual  history  of  economics.  Mankiw  for  instance 
doesn’t spare a word for it (2001), and Varian does as little (2007).
“The  depreciation  of  historical  fact  is  deeply,  and  probably  functionally, 
ingrained in the ideology of the scientific profession” (Kuhn 1996, 138). Yet 
with  the  loss  of  one’s  proper  intellectual  history,  an  awareness  of  the 
plurality of perspectives and methodological approaches that once was the 
glory  of  the  science  vanishes  as  well.  Commerce  and  society  appear 
differently depending on the perspective from which we envision them. Our 
‘methodological lenses’ decide what aspects of the economy we will focus 
on and how we do so. They also determine what problems remain essentially 
hidden.  Many  of  the  central  problems of  present  day commerce  remain 
completely in the dark as long as we only observe them from the angle of 
the economic mainstream. Thus, for instance, Norbert Häring in his study, 
Markt  und  Macht (“Power  and Markets,”  2010),  represents  how textbook 
economics systematically hinders taking into account the phenomenon of 
market power. This can similarly be shown for creativity (Brodbeck 1996) or 
the  inherent  dynamic  of  markets  (Schumpeter  1942;  Sraffa  1926;  Keen 
2010). In this way, a systematic blindness is spurred on, which already led 
Joan Robinson (quoted in Hill, Myatt 2010, 1) to the following question:
“It is true that we cannot, in the time available, teach everything that  
we  would  like.  But  why  do  we  pick  out  for  treatment  just  that  
selection  of  topics  that  is  least  likely  to  raise  any  questions  of  
fundamental importance?” 
“The point is: The way we think changes things... The freedom of thought 
depends on the fact that one can choose between different ways of thinking” 
(Hedtke 2008, 5-6). As correct and important this insight is, as completely is 
it  ignored by a textbook economics for which ‘multiple perspectives’ is a 
foreign term that is never even mentioned, once, as a possibility. “For every 
critical economic issue there are competing concepts and theories that lead 
to different conclusions. The problem is that when they are not missing from 
textbooks  altogether,  these  theories  are  almost  always  summarily 
dismissed” (Adler 2010, vx). “But if one is barred from all alternatives, one 
does not even know that one could chose if one knew the different thought 
concepts” (Hedtke 2008, 6).
The newer textbooks in particular drive such a method-monism to extremes, 
7 About Adam Smith, Samuelson writes (1955, 12-13): “First comes  Adam Smith, a Scotch bachelor with  powdered wig like  George 
Washington, who gathered together the earlier wisdom of business pamphleteers and philosophic system builders in his Wealth of 
Nations (1776). He recognized the virtues of free markets, and the times were ripe for his doctrines to become the bible of the rising 
middle class. About Marx, Samuelson says: ‘And then our picture gallery comes upon the black sheep, who was beyond the pen of the 
true classical tradition. Karl Marx, an exile from Germany, worked away in the British Museum vowing that the Bourgeoisie would pay  
for the suffering his boils cost him as he sat working out his theories of the inevitable collapse of capitalism’” (re-translated from the  
German edition).
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in as much as they do not even make their own perspective clear as a means 
of knowing. There exists a systematic difference between the observer and 
the observed, or between the knower and the known, and it is the task of an 
introductory chapter about the scope and methods of science to make the 
reader  aware,  at  least,  of  this  difference.  What  commerce  looks  like  to 
economists, how it appears to them, is not simply equivalent to commercial 
reality as such. Yet Varian, for instance, simply sweeps aside such reflections 
as superfluous. He writes, explicitly, that “it is rather inappropriate to begin 
the study of the economy with it” (2007, 1). Mankiw (2001, 3-17) takes this 
kind of pedagogy even further. At the beginning of his textbook, he explains 
his “10 principles of economics” so that they appear simply as facts, and not 
a higher level, selective description  of facts. Take, for example, Mankiw’s 
forth principle  “people  respond  to  incentives”  (2001,  7).  This  principle 
essentially  tells  us  to analyze  individual  behavior  in the  framework  of  a 
stimulus-response  model:  we  are  to  preconceive  people  as  if  they 
automatically  and  unconsciously  altered  their  behavior  in  response  to 
changes in market prices. As such, Mankiw essentially leads us to highlight 
certain characteristics  of  human beings,  i.e.  the easily  predictable,  while 
erasing others, i.e. the thoughtful, creative and essentially non-determinable 
aspects  of  human  activity.  But  Mankiw  does  not  reveal  this  as  a 
methodological pre-adjustment. He rather pretends to speak about reality as 
such. He simply tells us that all people factually respond to incentives. Thus 
he  misleads  his  students  into  taking  a  specific  view  of  social  reality 
uncritically as the equivalent of or the substitute for this reality. 
At least with Paul Samuelson one can perceive that such leveling is in no way 
unintended,  but  is  instead  a  conscious  pedagogical  program.  Thus,  he 
confronts millions of students at  the beginning of his  textbook with the 
following message (1955, 5-6): 
We must “firstly develop the faculty in ourselves to see things without 
partisanship or  previous assumptions,  that  is,  to see them as  they  
really  are,  and  without  reference  to  whether  that  is  pleasant  or  
unpleasant to us. (…)We know that a doctor passionately interested in 
stamping out  disease  must  first  train himself  to observe  things as  
they are. (…) Similarly, there are elements of valid reality in a given  
economic situation, however hard it may be to recognize and isolate  
them. There is not one theory of economics for Republicans and one  
theory for Democrats, one for workers and one for employers... On  
many basic principles concerning prices and employment, most  – if  
not all! – economists are in fairly close agreement” (translated from  
the German edition, emphasis in the German original).
These  few  references  may  satisfy  us  in  order  to  show  how  textbook 
economics narrows the student’s understanding systematically down to a 
single perspective. Instead of making this limitation known, economics leads 
the student to apply this perspective to ever more commercial as well as 
social  phenomena, and to describe the latter on this basis in continually 
more  refined  detail.  Students  are  thus  hindered  to  develop  their  own 
thought, if they are not completely blocked in regard to the following: They 
are  neither  given  the  tools  to  critically  reflect  on  the  grounds  of  the 
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assumptions underlying their own thought, nor to transform them in any 
respect. Again a similar point has been made by Kuhn with regard to the 
natural  sciences.  The  praxis  of  science  “will  seldom  evoke  overt 
disagreement  over  fundamentals”  (1996,  11).  “Given  a  textbook,  ...the 
creative  scientist  can  being  his  research  where  it  leaves  off  and  thus 
concentrate exclusively on the subtlest  and most  esoteric aspects of  the 
natural phenomenon that concern his group” (ibid, 20). At the same time, 
the student is isolated from all social problems that cannot be described 
with the help of the conceptual instruments of economic textbook science. 
He is, in other words, compelled to banish all of those problems that cannot 
be adequately focused within the economic perspective to the realm of the 
irrational and unscientific – even if they occur to him, as a human being, to 
be obvious and pressing. 
4 The Image of Man in Economic Textbook Science 
Certainly, economic assumptions about humanity are an object of scientific 
research.  Here,  advocates  of  mainstream economics  openly  acknowledge 
that  homo oeconomicus is simply a model, created for a particular, highly 
specific purpose (see for instance Kirchgässner 1991). Likewise they repeat 
Joan  Robinson’s  sentence:  a  model  that  didn’t  dispense  with  the  whole 
variety of reality would be as useless as a map on the scale of one to one 
(quoted in Felderer, Homburg 1999, 10). Every theory, the argument goes, 
must  emphasize  certain aspects of  reality as being ‘significant’  (positive 
abstraction)  while  dismissing  others  as  ‘meaningless’  or  as  ‘confusing 
collateral  circumstances’  (negative  abstraction),  so  that  it  may  serve  its 
specific end: the same thing should hold true with regard to the image of 
man. But even though this statement from Robinson is frequently quoted in 
economic  textbooks,  it  is,  with  regard  to  the  economics  curriculum, 
misleading in at  least  two senses. Firstly,  they suggest that students are 
continually  made  aware  of  abstractions  as  part  of  their  own  intellectual 
activity, as their own instruments of thought. But with our contemporary 
economics textbooks this is certainly not the case. And this concords with 
our second sense, which is that textbook economics never makes its view of 
economic man explicit as what it truly is: an  image of man. Rather,  homo 
oeconomicus functions as a mere fundamental assumption, which is casually 
introduced inside the framework of the greater theoretical  structure. It  is 
hardly reflected upon but only  applied to problem-solution. Thus, it is not 
explained to students, why they are to observe just the properties of homo 
oeconomicus as being ‘essential’  for humanity in commerce, nor do they 
learn to reflect upon the conflicting human properties they are forced to 
erase as mere disturbing matters. In other words, students are neither given 
any explicit rules as to how they are supposed to think of humans nor why 
they should  do so.  Yet  this  doesn’t  mean that  such rules  do  not  exist. 
Rather, what we see here is the binding force of “tacit knowledge” (Polanyi 
1966). This is the kind of knowledge students assimilate in the course of 
their  learning  process,  without  ever  growing  capable  of  articulating  it 
explicitly. In a sense, one can speak here of the development of a paradigm:
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“Scientists  work  from  models  acquired  through  education  and  
through  subsequent  exposure  to  the  literature  often without  quite  
knowing or  needing to know what  characteristics  have given these  
models the status of community paradigms. (…) Paradigms may be  
prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for  
research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them (...) While  
paradigms  remain  secure  …  they  can  function  without  agreement  
over rationalization or without  any attempt  of rationalization at  all”  
(Kuhn 1996, 46-49). 
But what composes the economics paradigm in regard to the understanding 
of human beings? Let’s begin our search by tracing the “law of diminishing 
marginal utility”. This law is taken as a central assumption about consumer 
behavior by all standard microeconomics textbooks. “This law states, that 
the amount of extra or marginal utility declines as a person consumes more 
and more of a good” (Samuelson 2005, 85). What does this mean? “Marginal 
utility denotes  the  additional  utility  you  get  from  consumption  of  an 
additional  unit  of  a  commodity  (ibid).  Thus,  this  additional  utility  is 
supposed to decline, the more units of the good are consumed altogether.8 
It is never thought, however, to become equal to or less than zero. 
Samuelson mentions, correctly, that this law of economics was formulated 
over a hundred years ago. Yet he suggests (2005, 85), that we can found 
this law by means of observing our own proper world of experience: 
“What  is  the  reason  for  this  law?  Utility  tends  to  increase  as  you  
consume  more  of  a  good.  However,  according  to the  law  of  
diminishing marginal  utility,  as you consume more and more, your  
total utility will grow at a slower and slower rate. Growth in total utility  
slows because your marginal utility … diminishes as more of the good 
is consumed. The diminishing marginal utility results from the fact that 
your enjoyment  of  the good drops off  as more and more  of it  its  
consumed” (my emphasis).
Samuelson calls upon the experience of the students in order to explain a 
major economic ‘law.’ At the same time, however, he instructs them to look 
at this experience through lenses already colored by this very law itself. Very 
clearly, this is an instance of circular logic, which in a careless manner mixes 
together method and empiricism, experience and theory. A similar case can 
be  observed in regard to an even more important  economic ‘law’  which 
postulates in principle the limitlessness of human needs, a non-satiation, as 
it is called by economists. In modern textbook economics this principle is 
hidden in the abstract concept of indifference curves, which Samuelson, for 
instance, introduces like this: “Start by assuming that you are a consumer 
who  buys  different  combinations  of  two  commodities,  say,  food  and 
clothing, at a given set of prices. For each combination of these two goods, 
assume that you prefer one to the other or are indifferent between the pair” 
8 Note that the concept of utility itself remains fairly obscure within some economic textbooks. Samuelson, for example, refers to it 
either as “satisfaction,” “subjective pleasure,” or “usefulness that a person derives from consuming a good or service” (2005, 84) And 
yet he warns: “But you should definitely  resist the idea that utility  is a psychological  function or feeling that can be observed or 
measured”, advising the reader to think of it just as a “scientific concept” (ibid). Mankiw, however, is less bothered by such sophistry. 
He simply denotes utility as “a measure of happiness or satisfaction” (2001, 447).
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(Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, 101). Again, the perception of the reader is 
narrowed  down from the  outset  with  regard  to  his  own  possibilities  of 
action. And once again, this is not made explicit. A sort of perception filter is 
installed, through which the world appears simply as an assembly of bundles 
of goods, between which people predictably choose according to their own 
utility:  “If  you offer the consumer two different  bundles,  he chooses the 
bundle that best suits his tastes. If the two bundles suit his tastes equally 
well, we say that the consumer is indifferent between the two bundles. (…) 
An indifference  curves  show the  bundles  of  consumption that  make  the 
consumer equally happy” (Mankiw 2001, 466). Other bundles of goods are 
taken to grant lower or higher levels of satisfaction. Thus, they are arranged 
on higher or lower indifference curves respectively. In addition, the following 
is taken for given: “Because the consumer prefers more of a good, points on 
a higher indifference curve … are preferred to points on a lower indifference 
curve”  (ibid,  467).  In  this  or  a  similar  fashion  all  current  economics 
textbooks  construct  in  a  few paragraphs  a  simple  “indifference  map”  in 
which the total decision space of people is depicted as something like a 
“utility mountain” (see figure 1; quoted from Stocker 2002, 143): 
“This diagram is analogous to a geographic contour map. A person  
who walks along the path indicated by a particular height contour on 
such  a  map  is  neither  climbing  nor  descending;  similarly,  the  
consumer who moves from one  position to another  along a  single  
indifference  curve  enjoys  neither  increasing  nor  decreasing  
satisfaction from the  change  in consumption.  (…) Note that  as  we  
increase both goods and thus move in a northeasterly direction across 
this map, we are crossing successive indifference curves; hence, we are 
reaching higher and higher levels of satisfaction (assuming that the  
consumer gets greater satisfaction from receiving increased quantities 
of both goods)” (Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, 102-103).
Notice again that a highly crucial assumption about humans is introduced 
here in a by the way fashion: microeconomic textbooks unanimously assume 
that having more of a bundle of goods is always preferred to having less of it 
(e.g. Varian 2007, 85). “Consumers usually prefer more of something to less 
of it” (Mankiw 2001, 468). It  appears as though people were, by internal 
necessity, always driven to climb up the “utility mountain” to ever dizzier 
heights, as if they were forced to continually chase after ever greater levels 
consumption. There seems to exist something deep within them that causes 
them to restlessly strive for ever greater bundles of goods. In other words, 
their peculiar journey across the mountain of utility recognizes no climax. It 
does not reference or account for any limitation of satisfaction. 
This is the basic idea behind “indifference curves” and the “utility mountain” 
(see again figure 1): utility (i.e. happiness or satisfaction) increases as more 
of both goods are consumed. Indifference curves C’, D’ and E’ are conceived 
analogous to height contours on a geographic contour map. Utility neither 
increases nor decreases along these curves. But the level of utility is higher 
along E’  than on D’,  and higher  on D than on   C’.  Note  that  textbooks 
economics, in contrast to this graph, usually does not assume a “summit” of 
the utility mountain to exist (point G). Rather, utility is thought to limitlessly 
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increase as consumption of both goods increases.
Figure 1
Samuelson explains this fundamental presupposition about human behavior 
and why he takes it for granted as little as do his colleagues. Such lack of 
explanation does not simply encumber the necessarily foreshortened forms 
of presentation normal to a textbook. Instead, it is deeply anchored in the 
tradition of economics research as such. A reference to one of the actual 
originators of the ‘laws’ of diminishing marginal utility and of non-satiation, 
the Prussian political economist Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), can 
illustrate  this:  “Man  arranges  his  actions  so  that  the  sum  of  his  life 
enjoyments will be of the greatest amount,” so Gossen already postulated in 
1854 (4-5).  We already know this from our economic textbooks. Yet the 
manner in which Gossen justifies this postulate is very illuminative:
“Not only is this maximization viewed by all men without exception as 
life’s ultimate purpose, but it is undoubtedly the real purpose of man’s  
life,  willed  by  his  Creator.  We  can  explain  the  ineradicable  and  
unceasing  human desire  to  reach this  objective  only  by  the  same  
procedure by which we seek to explain all other phenomena in nature, 
namely by assuming that the creator created in men a power whose  
effect  intervenes as this wish in his existence, as we also all  other  
phenomena  in  nature  through  the  assumption  of  effective  forces  
corresponding to certain specific  laws. ... Its purpose, and thus the  
purpose of the creator by his creation, can thus not be anything other 
than willing this effect, that he wanted man to follow its promptings.  
Hence it would frustrate totally or in part the purpose of the  Creator 
were we to attempt to neutralize this force in total or in part, as is the 
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intention of some moral codes promulgated by so many men. But how 
can a creation be more presumptuous than to want to frustrate the  
purpose of his creator in whole or in part!” (ibid, 2-3). 
Here we see: Gossen does not truly ground the law of decreasing marginal 
utility. Rather, it intervenes at a point where reflection stops, beyond which 
we are told that any further explanation is superfluous, and even appears to 
be vicious: “For its genuineness or truth, this  revelation needs no  human 
testimony; it confirms itself in such an indubitable manner that any other 
proof seems superfluous” (ibid, 4). This kind of dead end is not an anomaly 
in the history of economics. It is the norm. It is already found for instance in 
Adam Smith, the originator of economics as a science. For he claimed the 
workings of his famous “invisible hand” to be located beyond the purlieus of 
all scientific explanation (see Ulrich 1991). These workings, according to the 
Scottish moral philosopher, were like the creative power of a watchmaker, 
owing themselves  “in reality to the wisdom of  God”  and thus not  being 
rationally explainable by human mortals. Like the cogs of the clockwork, the 
latter must believe in this working, but not seek to ground it in a strictly 
scientific sense (1759, II.II.19). But the standard economics textbooks don’t 
say  a  word  to  draw the  student’s  attention  to  the  problematic  of  such 
fragmentary  foundations.  They  only  require  that  the  existence  of  social 
regularities be taken as given, as if they ever had been correctly founded. 
They mislead, in other words, students to unconsciously put themselves on 
the shoulders of long dead economists without ensuring the credibility of 
these foundations, not to speak of seeking alternative standpoints. 
Let’s  go a step further.  Textbook economics  does not  only confront  the 
students with the alleged laws of decreasing marginal utility and of non-
satiation. It also introduces them to the supposedly hard reality of scarcity: 
“Let us … give the consumer a fixed income. He has, say, $6 per day to 
spend, and he is confronted with fixed prices for each food and clothing unit 
–  $1.50 for food,  $1.00 for clothing”  (Samuelson,  Nordhaus 2005, 103). 
People, so it is suggested, always prefer to select bigger bundles of goods; 
yet this can only happen in the framework of their command over a given 
income, and thus over money. The actual wandering in the mountains of 
utility can only unfold along an income gradient, as if every human decision 
were  like  a  ball  slotted  into a  specific  track  (see  figure  2;  quoted from 
Stocker 2002, 159): left of this gradient, bundles of goods are not preferred 
because they grant too low levels of satisfaction; on the right, they cannot 
be  reached,  because  of  the  lack  of  income  to  back  them.  Thus,  there 
remains only one choice: “The consumer chooses the point of his budget 
constraint that lies on the highest indifference curve” (Mankiw 2001, 471). 
This is what economists call the principle of  utility maximization. Here is 
where we see: first, textbook economics offers the students only a single 
‘map’ for orientation in the economy.9 Closer inspection reveals, second, 
that this map in truth is not even analogous to a terrain map as long as we 
think of the latter as an aid to real orientation. Its purpose is, rather, to 
describe a seemingly inexorable program of action, which inevitably limits 
9 One might hold the idea that at least the action of the entrepreneur or firm is represented by textbook economics in a different 
manner. But this is systematically not the case, in as much as its theory of supply feeds back to the same way of representing human 
action as its demand theory. It only replaces “indifference curves” with “isoquants” and the “budget constraints” with “isocost lines” as a 
foundation for its theory of profit maximization. For the particularly abstruse assumptions that result from these presuppositions, see 
Mirowski 1989.
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human freedom of choice to a single point in a pregiven commodity space. 
Economic textbooks certainly qualify students to calculate this program in 
all of its details. They also instruct them to make it the foundation for all 
further questions concerning economic theory and politics. But at the same 
time they systematically disempower students, or even force them to retreat 
from, becoming conscious of the image of man lying at the foundation of 
this program. 
It escapes them, for instance, that textbook economics implicitly supposes 
that man can only chose between given goods whose price is dictated by the 
market. Man cannot create for himself his choices, neither can he create his 
own area of action, but must always chose between given things within a 
pre-fixed commodity space. This is the equivalent of saying: the actor does 
not have the choice when it comes down to the question of the rules that 
govern  his  choice”  (Baurmann  1996,  325).  Moreover,  money  is  always 
preconceived as the entry ticket into the realm of satisfaction. One must 
possess it, if one wants to act at all, and one must always possess more of it, 
if one wants to experience an increase in one’s happiness or satisfaction. 
Also, the reverse has to hold true: as soon as one controls more money, 
one’s  own  utility  must unhesitatingly  mount:  Every increase  in  income 
invariably shifts the budget line, i.e. the path through the utility mountain, 
outward, i.e. in such a way, that not only higher regions of utility mountains 
can be climbed, but also must be climbed. 
This is the economic idea about “optimal choice:” Given the basic textbooks 
assumptions about individual behavior, individual choice must, by necessity, 
seek the highest possible indifference curve attainable within the pregiven 
boundaries of a fixed income. Invariably, it comes to rest at point E (see 
again figure 2).
Figure 2
We have yet to name a further assumption. Man must not only calculate all 
the action possibilities open to him individually. He also has to be able to 
compare them one to the other. Let us denominate three bundles of goods 
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A, B, and C, as economic textbooks usually do. When A is preferred to B, and 
B to C, so the economic mainstream teaches, one must inevitably prefer A to 
C,  too.  Otherwise  one’s  behavior  is  considered  “kinky,”  “irrational”  or 
“inconsistent,”  and  thus  unworthy  of  further  analysis.  “What  is  usually 
assumed is  that  consumers are reasonably consistent in their tastes and 
actions – that they do not flail  around in unpredictable ways and do not 
make themselves miserable by persistent error” (Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, 
89).  What  is  praised  here  as  “reasonable”  shows  itself,  upon  closer 
inspection,  as  clearly  incompatible  with  fundamental  human  capacities. 
Microeconomics does not simply claim to map and calculate actions in the 
present moment, but pretends that it can prognosticate them. In order to do 
so,  it  must,  at  least  implicitly,  preclude  “erratic  changes”  in  choosing 
behavior over an, in principle, endless span of time. Whoever prefers A to B 
today, and B to C, must also prefer A to C in the future. In other words, the 
indifference curves and thus the whole of the utility mountain are presumed 
to be  stable  in  time  and space.  Man  is  not  supposed  to  ever  alter  his 
preferences from one moment to another (see for instance Becker 1990). 
Yet,  an  essential  human  property  is  thus  negated  and  damned  to 
meaninglessness: the capacity to reflect on one’s own needs and tastes and 
from  this  background  to  rethink  old  decisions  and  to  develop  new 
predilections. Any idea of the human potential to change oneself is missing 
here,  because  this  potential  would  shake  the  utility  mountain  as  if  an 
earthquake  occurred  from  within.  It  would  shove  aside  and  bend  the 
indifference curves, thus simply making any microeconomic calculations and 
prognoses of human action null and void – precisely those calculations and 
prognoses  which  are  presumed  in  the  textbooks  without  question  (see 
Graupe  2007,  59-68).  Also,  the  inventions  of  new goods  and  thus  the 
development of new tastes and desires are completely cast into the dark. 
But what actually allows textbook economics to ground its statements about 
human beings? And what consequences result on this basis for the image of 
man? Let  us  look again  into the  history of  economics,  about  which  the 
textbooks  of  economics  are  so  abstinently  silent.  Beyond  the  religious 
grounding of the ‘laws’  of  economics, as we have found with Smith and 
Gossen,  we  find  this:  “The  full  truth  is  that  the  teaching  of  political 
economics in the manner in which it is professionally practiced today, is in 
the strict sense a mechanistic science, like none other than classical physics” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971, 1). “One must study the laws of social cooperation 
in exactly the same way as the physicist  studies the laws of mechanics” 
(Mises  1940,  2).  Since  the  second half  of  the  19th century,  mainstream 
economics has literally taken up this demand. Back then, economists like 
Irving Fisher,  Léon Walras and W. Stanley Jevons began to transpose the 
formulas of mechanics, especially in regard to its notion of energy and the 
differential calculus, to the social world (see Mirowski 1989). In the course of 
this process, they more or less consciously pasted the previously named 
rigid assumptions about human beings in order to justify their own claims 
and  standards  of  scientificity.  They  began  to  think  in  terms  of  utility 
mountains  only  to  be  able  to  describe  human  actions  with  the  same 
formulas with which physicists calculate the motion of particles. In order to 
correspond to their own ideal of science, they simply translated the central 
concepts  of  mechanics  into economic  concepts.  “Utility“,  as  for  instance 
Irving Fisher made clear, was equated with “energy,” “marginal utility” with 
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“force,” the “commodity space” with (physical) “space,” and “negative utility” 
with (physical) “labor” (1925, 85). Neo-classical theory and thus the current 
crop of  economics textbooks blindly absorbed this mechanistic  frame of 
concepts, without ever thinking about its presuppositions.10 This also holds 
true  for  the  concepts  of  utility  and  profit  maximization,  with  which 
economists invariably describe  all  human activity,  as though it  were  self 
evident (see for instance Becker 1990). These concepts have also nothing to 
do  with  a  faithful  observation of  the  social  world,  but  instead  with  the 
imperative to manufacture a social physics: 
“‘Mecanique  Sociale’  may  one  day  take  her  place  along  with  
‘Mecanique  Celeste,’  throned upon  the  double-sided height  of  one  
maximum principle,  the  supreme  pinnacle  of  moral  as  of  physical  
science. As the movements of each particle, constrained or loose, in a 
material  cosmos are continually subordinated to one maximum sum-
total of accumulated energy, so the movements of each soul whether 
selfishly isolated or linked sympathetically,  may continually realising  
the  maximum  energy  of  pleasure.  (...)  The  invisible  energy  of  
electricity  is  grasped  by  the  marvelous  methods  of  Lagrange,  the  
invisible energy  of  pleasure  may  admit  of  a  similar  handling”  
(Edgeworth 1881, 9-13).
For the image of man, it follows that men are to be pictured as machines, 
because otherwise the economist  would be incapable of carrying out  his 
calculations: 
“The  conception  of  Man  as a  pleasure  machine may  justify  and  
facilitate  the  employment  of  mechanical  terms  and  Mathematical  
reasoning in social science” (ibid, 15, emphasis in the original).
We can see, here, that the economists’ image of man is simply not the result 
of a long search for truth or description of human action as realistic as 
possible, but just the by-product of a specific, if also mostly unconscious 
ideal  of  science.  It  exists  only  because  it  suits  the  economist  and  his 
scientific pretenses. According to Milton Friedman (1953, 14-15), who was a 
Nobel Prize winner for economics, such an instrumental understanding is 
basic to economic theory:
“Really  important  and significant  hypotheses  will  be  found to have  
‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of 
reality,  and  in  general,  the  more  significant  the  theory,  the  more  
unrealistic  the  assumption  (in  this  sense).  (…)  To  be  important,  
therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions 
(…) To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant question to ask  
about  the  ‘assumptions’  of  a  theory  is  not  whether  they  are  
descriptively  ‘realistic,’  for  they  never  are,  but  whether  they  are  
sufficiently  good  approximations  for  the  purpose  in  hand”  (my  
10 Clearly this accords with the fact that the early neo-classicals rarely were completely clear about the consequences of their theory for 
the image of man (see Mirowski 1989).
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emphasis).
Walter Bagehot’s perspective on the image of human beings is even more 
revealing (1885, 5):
“Of course we know that this is not so, that men are not like this; but 
we assume it for simplicity's, sake, as a hypothesis. And this deceives 
many excellent  people,  for from deficient  education they have very  
indistinct ideas what an abstract science is. More competent persons,  
indeed,  have  understood  that  English  Political  Economists  are  not  
speaking of real men,  but of imaginary ones: not of men  as we see  
them, but of men as it is  convenient to us to suppose they are” (my  
emphasis).
Certainly, every scientific process of abstraction pursues a certain goal and, 
in this sense, can be seen as interested. The textbooks all agree here, either 
implicitly or explicitly: “the level of abstraction from reality depends on the 
purpose for which the model is built” (Koutsoyiannis 1975, 1). Yet the actual 
problem  lies  elsewhere.  For  the  economic  textbooks  neither  reflect  the 
implications of this simple scientific-theoretical insight, nor do they reveal 
the purpose of their own highly specific abstractions. “Economic theory is a 
method to understand human behavior,” said, for example, Robert Lucas, 
the  1995  Nobel  Prize  winner  in  Economics,  “in  which  we  investigate 
artificial, fictional people –  imitations of robots, one might say – that are 
constructed in order to analyze the functionality of artificial economic orders 
that are constituted from these actors” (quoted in Brodbeck 2009, 97, my 
emphasis). Yet students do not learn to actively go through this imaginative 
procedure,  but  are  instead pushed to merely accept  the results of these 
procedures  as  seemingly  irresistible  ‘facts.’  They  are  not  given  the 
possibility of explaining the extent  to which they are  misled to imagine 
human beings as utility machines or robots; they simply learn to apply these 
images tacitly in their first or second semesters. Their further study then 
offers hardly any occasion to touch on this paradigmatic understanding ever 
again.  Rather,  this  understanding’s  field  of  application  is  continuously 
extended. What students learn to consider as ‘normal’ behavior for instance 
in the regard to the choice between clothing and food, is, in higher courses, 
uncritically transferred to all  the situations of life: “we can”,  it  is  taught, 
“never have enough of everything, and so must accept tradeoffs among the 
different  things  we  value  – including  life,  love, and  the  most  trivial 
pleasures” (Friedman 1996, 33, my emphasis). In brief, textbook economics 
introduces students first to a highly selective picture of human beings, and 
then persuades them to blindly apply this picture to all human behavior. Said 
differently, it trains them into the already mentioned tradition of economic 
imperialism, of which Gary Becker says (1993): “The horizons of economics 
need to be expanded. Economists can talk not only about the demand for 
cars, but also about matters such as the family, discrimination, and religion, 
and about prejudice, guilt, and love.” 
It is in this way that economic textbooks lead to gradually imagining every 
individual  social  domain  as  a  market  in the  sense  of  an  aggregation of 
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individual utility machines. Whether we are dealing with marriage, church 
attendance, or the working environment: the theory of the “perfect market” 
always awakens the impression as if the multiplicity of these machines could 
be organized in a giant clockwork with hardly any friction. The consumers’ 
individual utility maximizing behaviors lead to aggregate economic demand, 
and  the  profit  maximizing  behaviors  of  individual  firms  to  aggregate 
economic supply. But what moves both in common is not the will of any 
individual,  but  only  and  uniquely  the  “unconscious,  automatic  price 
mechanism”  (Samuelson 1955,  39).  “Who does the rationing?  A planning 
board?  Congress?  The  president?  No.  The  marketplace”  (Samuelson, 
Nordhaus 2005, 59). Students learn to imagine the whole world as if nothing 
else mattered but “the rationing of the purse.” 
“The  power  of  the  purse  dictates  the  distribution  of  income  and  
consumption. Those with higher incomes end up with larger houses,  
more clothing,  and longer vacations.  When backed up by cash,  the  
most  urgently needs get  fulfilled through the  demand curve”  (ibid,  
60, my emphasis).
Thus, economic textbook science makes students to blindly accept an unjust 
distribution of  income as the starting point  of all  scientific  reflection As 
such, it encourages them to systematically as well as uncritically deal with 
social inequality as an unquestionable fact. Yet this is not enough still. It 
also cements, below the radar of awareness, a further form of fundamental 
inequality. This form can be sussed out by asking one simple question: does 
the economist  actually understand himself as a  utility  machine?  Does he 
consider himself a homo oeconomicus or does he only utilize this concept in 
order  to  speak  about  other  human  beings?  Actually,  students  learn  to 
perceive free market competition – the “rationing of the purse” – not from an 
internal but from a kind of external perspective only. As though it were self-
explanatory,  from  the  very  first  semester  they  learn  to  look  upon  the 
economy  with  the  help  of  graphs  and  formulas,  as  though  they  could, 
through some curious process, place themselves outside of it. It seems as if 
they were able to gain a ‘God’s eye’ perspective on people and markets. 
Certainly, Adam Smith already (1759, IV.I.11) prizes this kind of observation:
“The perfection of police, the extension of trade and manufactures,  
are  noble  and  magnificent  objects.  The  contemplation  of  them  
pleases us, and we are interested in whatever can tend to advance  
them. They make part of the great system of government, and the  
wheels of the political machine seem to move with more harmony and 
ease by means of them.” 
At least, Smith still remarks that this distant observation is fundamentally 
nothing other than an illusion. Explicitly he names it a “deception of nature” 
impeding  the  true  knowledge  of  commercial  reality.  For  him,  ultimate 
knowledge is  gained out  of  immediate experience,  out  of  a  sympathetic 
position within human society, not from an outside observer’s standpoint. 
(cp. ibid, IV.I). Yet ultimately Smith dubs this deception good, in as much as 
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it promises to satisfy a goal: “And it is well that nature imposes upon us in 
this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion 
the industry of mankind” (ibid). Only in the position of distant observation 
can the human spirit be formed into an instrument of unlimited striving for 
growth,  and  because  of  this  Smith  tells  us  to  approve  this  speculative 
position. Economics textbooks blindly follow this command, without making 
this  underlying  instrumental  understanding  explicit  or  even  critically 
thinking it through. Thus, the students are apprenticed, silently and without 
being presented any alternative, in a pitiless positioning outside of economic 
affairs. At the same time, they are trained to negate any kind of source of 
knowledge that may spring from conscious participation in these affairs. It is 
a matter of what Alfred Schütz (quoted in Brodbeck 2009, 102) observes 
without intending any critical undertone: 
The social scientist “is not involved in the observed situation, which  
interests him not practically, but only cognitively. It is not the theater 
of his activities, but only the object of his contemplation. He does not 
operate in it and has no vital interest in the outcome of his actions;  
no hope and fear are bound together with the consequences of his  
acts. He looks at the social world with the same cool equilibrium with 
which the natural scientist follows the events in his laboratory.”
This  is  the  background  that  allows  us  to  explain  why,  for  instance, 
Samuelson (1966, 64) conceives people simply as the “guinea-pigs” of his 
analysis. Yet in one essential point, Schütz’s remark still falls short. For his 
proper position outside of society does not simply serve the economist as a 
place of contemplation. Rather, his science offers him the opportunity to 
actively intervene in the sphere of economic affairs as if coming from the 
outside. Already, Adam Smith praises this in the direct continuation of the 
above cited passage (1759, IV.I.11): 
“We  take  pleasure  in  beholding  the  perfection  of  so  beautiful  and  
grand a system, and we are uneasy  till  we remove any obstruction 
that  can  in  the  least  disturb  or  encumber  the  regularity  of  its  
motions” (my emphasis).
“The purpose of theoretical science is … to control the real world” (Menger 
1883, 33). Even Mankiw (2006, 29) understands the economist, in truth, not 
as a disinterested researcher, but as a social engineer, who should guide the 
destiny of the economic machine:
“Economists like to strike the pose of a scientist. I know this, because I 
often do it  myself.  When I teach undergraduates, I  very consciously  
describe the field of  economics  as a science,  so no student  would  
start  the  course  thinking  he  was  embarking  on  some  squishy  
academic  endeavor.  (…)  Having  recently  spent  two  years  in  
Washington as an economic adviser [of Georg W. Bush – S.G] at a time 
when the U.S. economy was struggling to pull out of a recession, I am 
reminded  that  the  subfield  of  macroeconomics  was  born not  as  a  
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science but more as a type of engineering.  God put macroeconomists 
on  earth  not  to  propose  and  test  elegant  theories but  to  solve  
practical problems” (my emphasis).
“Cool heads at the service of warm hearts” (Samuelson, Nordhaus 2005, 7): 
Students are not only guided to the “dispassionate development and testing 
of  theories”  (Mankiw  2001,  20-21)  but  also  attuned  to  the  role  of 
experimenters,  who can manipulate other human beings, markets or even 
whole nations according to their own will. “The economy is a system without 
a steering wheel,” Samuelson claims (1948, 255). And the textbooks leave 
no doubt as to the fact that the economically educated elite not only have to 
put the steering wheel in place, but have to firmly grip it:
“However, with understanding usually comes the ability to predict and 
to  control,  and  this  has  been  the  case  in  microeconomics.  The  
concepts and relationships economists have developed … provide the 
basis for the design of policies by governments wishing to influence  
the outcome of  this  process,  or  alternatively for  the critique of  the  
actions  governments  may  take”  (Gravelle,  Rees  1981,  1,  my  
emphasis).
To  put  this  in  terms  of  another  economics  metaphor:  if  we  think  of 
commerce as a game or play, whose rules are inalterably given to the actors 
(see for instance Friedman 1971), then it  is merely a step to get to this 
conclusion: “The economists determine the rules of the play” (Kyrer 2005, 7).
This shows the problematic of a twofold, and one could even say split image 
of man that the standard economics textbooks propagate, but do not reflect 
upon: on the one side most humans are considered utility machines, robots 
or guinea pigs. On the other side, a few other human beings exist, who, as 
part of the elite, can steer and control those utility machines, robots, and 
guinea pigs. The question of whether such elite can, at least, be entrusted 
with the common good may appear in any case as a subsequent question 
only.  But  basically,  this  question is  posed as rarely in the framework  of 
standard  economics  research as  the  question of  whether  the  systematic 
difference between game strategies and game rules, players and referees 
makes any sense in the first place (see Graupe 2011). In contrast to pure 
textbook economics,  a  researcher  like  Patrick  Gunning  nevertheless  puts 
into explicit words the basic logic of the science’s two-fold image of man 
(1988, 168): 
“Homo  economicus must  always  maximize  his  financial  wealth  in  
situations specified by the economist. The a priori being can create  
his own situations.  He can even become an economist. To put this  
still  differently,  Homo  economicus is  a  puppet  or  robot  that  is  
programmed  by  the  economist.  The  a  priori  being  is  his  own  
controller. It is the a priori being who encompasses the humanness in 
the human being. Economic models must be peopled by individuals  
who are programmed by the modelbuilder. They cannot be peopled  
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by a priori beings. The usefulness of models lies in the fact that they 
enable  the  modelbuilder  to  contrast  (1)  what  he  can,  through  
reflection, come to know about the nature of the a priori being with  
(2) the puppet or robot that he employs in his model. In this way, he 
can  isolate  the  inventive,  creative,  programming,  controlling,  alert  
aspects of human nature.”
5 A Prospective View 
The economics curriculum, under the surface of awareness, shapes an image 
of man, which splits society into mere cogs in the ‘machine’ of the economy 
on the one side and omnipotent social  engineers on the other side. The 
latter are portrayed as if they could steer this machine from the outside 
according to their own precepts. Thus, the curriculum gives the impression 
as  if  homo  oeconomicus’  inexorable  striving  for  utility  and  gain 
maximization could always be held within bounds by sensible managerial 
precepts.  In  generating  this  combination,  it  completely  obscures  one 
essential question: what kind of game is being played when the elite learns 
to recognize itself in the idea of striving for gain and personal utility, on the 
one side, while at the same time learning tacitly to locate themselves outside 
of the competitive order so as to perform as its judge and leader in the 
name of their own goals? An idea of such omnipotence contrasts with the 
danger that young people will only silently identify with homo oeconomicus 
and thus learn to count themselves among the impotent part of society only, 
who find delight merely in consumption, but have no ability to actively shape 
the world around them as well as their selves. It is possible, that the image 
of  man  of  the  economics  curriculum  misleads  students  into  constantly 
wavering between these positions of omnipotence and impotence; unable to 
find a middle way between these extremes. It has been my concern to show 
and  outline  this  fundamental  problem,  how  it  arose  and  against  what 
background it stands. As for viable alternatives, I must leave this question 
open at this point. Yet let us go at least this far: a first step, in my own 
experience  of  teaching,  consists  in  encouraging  students  to  become 
conscious of the many ways in which the economic “missionaries” and their 
“bibles” can be disputed. A critical course through the history of economic 
ideas empowers them to be able to find their own actual point of view and 
the reasons for it. “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping 
from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have 
been, into every corner of our minds” (Keynes cited in Keen 2010, xii). Yet 
this escape is only possible for those ideas that one really is aware of. At 
least we should (re)introduce the discipline’s intellectual history, as much as 
the  explicit  reflection  on  the  economics  image  of  man,  into  economics 
teaching. This could serve as a first step in order that young generations are 
no longer brought up as the slaves of dead economists and – lets add to the 
often cited image from Keynes – dead or living textbook authors. 
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